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Crawn v. Campo,
136 N.J. 494, 643 A.2D 600 (1994).
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Michael Crawn sued defendant John Campo to recover for injuries
sustained during a pickup softball game. The New Jersey Law Division ruled for
the plaintiff. The jury found that Campo acted "in reckless disregard for the
safety of [Crawn]." The court determined that the applicable standard of duty of
care for players engaged in informal sports is to avoid injurious conduct that is
reckless or intentional. The appellate division reversed the trial court on the
proper standard of care required, concluding that the applicable standard is to
avoid conduct that would constitute negligence under the circumstances. The Su-
preme Court of New Jersey modified the judgment, and as modified, affirmed.
The court held that the appropriate duty of care of participants in informal recre-
ational sports is to avoid the infliction of injury caused by reckless or intentional
conduct. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
granting the defendant's motion for a new trial.
FACTS
On May 1, 1988, the plaintiff, Michael Crawn, and the defendant, John
Campo, were participants in a "pick-up" game of softball. Friends or bystanders
joined in each week, so that the composition of the teams changed from week to
week. The teams were not part of a league, and there were no official referees or
umpires. The parties agreed that the general rules of softball governed. They
disagreed, however, whether there was a rule prohibiting sliding.
The defendant was the runner on first base, and the next batter hit a ground
ball to the shortstop. The shortstop flipped the ball to the second baseman to try
for the force-out. The defendant slid into second base, taking the legs out from
underneath the second baseman.
With the defendant safe on second, the next batter hit a fly ball to right field.
The defendant rounded third base and headed for home. The plaintiff, the catch-
er, testified that he was standing on the first base side of home plate. His left
foot touched the right side the plate, and he faced the oncoming runner. The de-
fendant, according to the plaintiff, lowered his body and ran into the plaintiff's
left side. The plaintiff fell backwards, with the defendant ending up on top of the
plaintiff's lower leg. The plaintiff heard a pop in his leg, followed by severe
pain. He later tried to resume play, but when he tried to run, his left leg col-
lapsed under him. The plaintiff went to the hospital and was diagnosed with a
torn knee ligament, which required surgery.'
1. Plaintiff claimed that defendant deliberately ran into him, with the goal of dislodging the ball
1
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The plaintiff sued to recover for his personal injuries, alleging in three sepa-
rate counts that the defendant was liable because his conduct had been either
negligent, reckless or intentional. The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the inten-
tional conduct claim before the trial. The jury found for the plaintiff, holding that
the defendant's conduct had been reckless and that the plaintiff had not assumed
the risk of reckless conduct. The defendant brought a motion for a new trial,
which the court granted on evidentiary grounds.
The plaintiff appealed the grant of a new trial, and the defendant cross-ap-
pealed. The appellate division affirmed the trial court's grant of a new trial, but
reversed on the proper standard required to establish liability for injuries sus-
tained in informal athletic competition. It held that the proper standard was rea-
sonableness under the circumstances - ordinary negligence.
The defendant filed a motion for leave to appeal the appellate division deci-
sion on the standard of care issue. The plaintiff filed a motion of leave to cross
appeal on the affirmance of the grant of a new trial. The Supreme Court of New
Jersey granted both motions.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court of New Jersey considered two main issues: (1) the nature
of a player's duty to avoid afflicting physical injury on another player, and (2)
the necessity of expert testimony as to the applicable standard of care governing
a softball game. The court also briefly dealt with the trial court's grant of
defendant's motion for a new trial.
The main issue the court discussed was the appropriate standard of care appli-
cable to informal sports activities. The trial court had determined that only reck-
less or intentional conduct would be liable, but the appellate division accorded
liability to conduct unreasonable under the circumstances. The Supreme Court
held that the trial court had been correct in its determination.
The court stated that the majority of jurisdictions that have considered this
issue have concluded that to constitute a tort, conduct must exceed the level of
ordinary negligence. "[T]he emerging legal standard requires either recklessness
or specific intent to injure by defendant."2 The Illinois Appellate Court in
Nabozny v. Barnhill3 held that, "a player is liable for injury in a tort action if his
conduct is such that it is either deliberate, willful or with a reckless disregard for
the safety of the other player to cause injury to that player.",4
The reasoning behind the preference for a standard of care that exceeds negli-
gent conduct is the perception that the risk of injury is a common and inherent
from plaintiff's glove to avoid the out. He argued there was enough room for defendant to run past
him and touch home plate without making contact. Defendant, on the other hand, claimed that plain-
tiff had one foot on either side of home plate, and that the only way to tag home safely was to slide.
2. Daniel E. Lazaroff, Torts & Sports: Participant Liability to CoParticipants for Injuries Sus-
tained During Competition, 7 U. MAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REv. 191, 195, 198 (1990).
3. 334 N.E.2d 258 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
4. Id. at 261.
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aspect of informal sports activity. In Knight v. Jewett,5 the Supreme Court of
California noted that "the nature of a sport is highly relevant in defining the duty
of care owed by a particular defendant ... in some situations, ... the careless
conduct of others is treated as an 'inherent risk' of a sport ..... ' That court con-
cluded that only if one player intentionally injures another or engages in conduct
that is "so reckless as to be totally outside the range of the ordinary activity
involved in the sport ..." is there a breach of duty.'
The New Jersey court discussed the two policy reasons that justified the im-
position of a recklessness standard: the promotion of vigorous participation in
athletic activities9 and the desire to avoid a flood of litigation."0 The appellate
division, however, had concluded that these two policy justifications did not
outweigh New Jersey's well-established reliance on the ordinary negligence
standard and its aversion to tort immunities. It explained that the only immunities
acceptable were for important reasons of public policy and availabe in relatively
exceptional situations. The appellate division did not consider the policy reasons
that favor and encourage sports activities important enough to warrant such im-
munity. The Supreme Court agreed that wrongful conduct by the participants in
sports activities should not be totally removed from the law of torts, but should
be accorded partial immunity. It stated that legislative policy at least indirectly
supports such a partial immunity. The New Jersey legislature established tort
immunity for volunteer athletic coaches for injuries to participants except when
conduct is willful, wanton or grossly negligent." Accredited sports officials
have the same sort of immunity.
12
The court next asserted that participating in recreational sports is different
from participating in other activities. For example, in many sports, including
softball, some amount of contact is expected." Furthermore, a high level of
emotional intensity accompanies the physicality of sports. 4 The wide variations
5. 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992).
6. Id. at 708.
7. Id. at 711.
8. See also Gauvin v. Clark, 537 N.E.2d 94 (Mass. 1989) (applying reckless disregard of safety
standard to injury during college hockey game); Ross v. Clouser, 637 S.W.2d 11, 14 (Mo. 1982)
(applying recklessness standard to injuries arising from church picnic softball game); Dotxler v.
Tuttle, 449 N.W.2d 774 (Neb. 1990) (applying wilful-or-reckless-disregard of safety standard to inju-
ry arising in a pickup basketball game); Marchetti v. Kalish, 559 N.E.2d 699 (Ohio 1990) (applying
either recklessness or intentional conduct standard); Kabella v. Bouschelle, 742 P.2d 290, 294 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1983) (disallowing claim for negligence for injury in recreational football game). But see
Lestina v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 501 N.W.2d 28 (Wis. 1993) (adopting the ordinary standard of
negligence for sports cases).
9. See Nabozny v. Barnhill, 334 N.E.2d 258, 260 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (stating that the law
should not "place unreasonable burdens on the free and vigorous participation in sports by our
youth").
10. See Marchetti, 559 N.E.2d at 702 (asserting that failing to apply a recklessness standard
would "open the floodgates to a myriad of lawsuits involving the backyard games of children").
11. NJ. STAT. § 2A:62A-6 (1993).
12. NJ. STAT. § 2A.62-6.1 (1993).
13. See Gauvin v. Clark, 537 N.E.2d 94, 96 (Mass. 1989).
14. See Ross v. Clouser, 637 S.W.2d 11, 14 (Mo. 1982) (noting "proper fervor" of competition);
1995]
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in expectations regarding the physical contact and emotional intensity that is
appropriate from sport to sport and from game to game complicates the analysis
of the appropriate standard of care, as does the fact that violations of rules, even
safety rules, are often a part of the game." Yet is spite of this, the appellate
division felt that courts could adequately evaluate sports conduct and make clear
to juries that a participant who creates only "normal" or "ordinary" risks acts as
a "reasonable person" under the circumstances. 6
The Supreme Court of New Jersey found three problems with the appellate
division's determination. To begin with, it would be extraordinarily difficult to
judge conduct based on limitless variables concerning how different groups of
people play the same game. Second, the reasonableness of conduct of an average
person is highly subjective and cannot be reliably equated with the conduct of an
average person under similar circumstances. Finally, there rarely is complete
agreement between a group of people, eighteen to twenty in the case of softball,
playing a team sport. A legal duty of care based on the standard of what an
average reasonable person objectively would do under the circumstances is "illu-
sory.
The Supreme Court concluded that a recklessness standard is the correct one
to apply in the sports context. This heightened standard will result in according
liability for conduct that is clearly unreasonable and unacceptable from the per-
spective of those engaged in the sport, while leaving free from the supervision of
the courts the risk-laden conduct that is inherent in sports and usually assumed to
be "part of the game."
The second issue before the Supreme Court of New Jersey concerned the
defendant's contention that expert testimony was essential to establish the stan-
dard of care that applied to players in a softball game. The trial court and ap-
pellate division determined that expert testimony was not necessary to establish
the duty owed. The Supreme Court of New Jersey agreed.
The test as to the need of expert testimony is whether the subject matter is
"so esoteric that jurors of common judgment and experience cannot form a valid
judgment whether the conduct of the party was reasonable."'7 The court recog-
nized that some sports-injury cases from other jurisdictions have allowed the in-
troduction of expert testimony, but these cases dealt with organized leagues with
specific rules. That was not present in this case. The court concluded that even
though an expert would not be able to testify as to idiosyncracies of a specific
softball game, jurors have sufficient understanding of the rules and conventions
of a particular game as explained by its participants. Therefore, the lower court
Lazaroff, supra note 2, at 195 (noting difficulty of distinguishing "between negligence and reckless-
ness in the context of a game where players are encouraged to play with reckless abandon").
15. See Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 710 (Cal. 1992); Oswald v. Township High Sch. Dist.,
406 N.E.2d 157, 160 (11. App. Ct. 1980); Turcotte v. Fell, 502 N.E.2d 964, 969-70 (N.Y. 1986).
16. The Appellate Division listed at least 10 different factors to be considered in determining
whether conduct was reasonable. Crawn v. Campo, 630 A.2d 368, 376 (NJ. Super. 1993).
17. Butler v. Acme Markets, 445 A.2d 1141, 1147 (NJ. 1982) (quoting 2 HARPER & JAMES,
LAW op TORTS § 17.1 (1956)).
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committed no error by refusing to allow the defendant's expert to testify.
The third and final issue presented to the New Jersey Supreme Court was the
basis for the trial court's grant of the defendant's motion for a new trial. The
defendant based his motion on the combined effect of three procedural rulings.
The trial court determined that these three factors combined to create a manifest
denial of justice. The appellate division found support in the record for the grant
of a new trial. The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed, finding that the
result was "clearly the product of mistake, passion, prejudice or partiality.""8
CONCLUSION
In summary, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the applicable stan-
dard of care for participants in recreational sports activities is to avoid reckless
or intentional conduct, and not just conduct that would constitute negligence
under the circumstances. It also found that expert testimony was unnecessary in
this situation where the jury gained sufficient knowledge about the rules of this
particular softball game from the participants who testified. The court modified
the appellate division's judgment concerning the proper standard of care, and as
modified, affirmed.
Margaret A. Larrea
18. Crawn, 643 A.2d at 609 (citing Lanzet v. Greenberg, 594 A.2d 1309, 1312 (NJ. 1991)).
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